Investment Knowledge
home index product knowledge market data analytics risk management knowledge
 
knowledge discuss
discuss  

Pricing Collateralized Derivatives


Collateral arrangements are always counterparty-based as different counterparties may have different CSA agreements. Thus, financial institutions normally group derivatives into counterparty portfolios first and then process them separately. The difference between counterparties is determined by counterparty credit qualities whereas the difference in collateralization is distinguished by the terms and conditions of CSA agreements.


Interest rate swaps collectively account for two-thirds of all outstanding derivatives. An ISDA mid-market swap rate is based on a mid-day polling. Dealers use this market rate as a reference and make some adjustments to quote an actual swap rate. The adjustment or swap premium is determined by many factors, such as credit risk, liquidity risk, funding cost, operational cost and expected profit, etc.


Unlike generic mid-market swap rates, swap premia are determined in a competitive market according to the basic principles of supply and demand. A swap client first contacts a number of swap dealers for a quotation and then chooses the most competitive one. If a premium is too low, the dealer may lose money. If a premium is too high, the dealer may lose the competitive advantage.


To circumvent this difficulty, this article uses an indirect empirical approach. We define a swap premium spread as the premium difference between two swap contracts that have exactly the same terms and conditions but are traded with different CSA counterparties. We reasonably believe that if two contracts are identical except counterparties, the swap premium spread should reflect counterparty credit risk only, as all other risks/costs are identical.


Empirically, we obtain a unique proprietary dataset from an investment bank. We use these data and a statistical measurement to examine whether credit risk and collateralization, alone or in combination, are sufficient to explain market swap premium spreads. We first study the marginal impact of credit risk. Since credit default swap (CDS) premium theoretically reflects the credit risk of a firm, we use the market swap premium spreads as the response variable and the CDS premium differences between two counterparties as the explanatory variable. The estimation result shows that the adjusted is 0.7472, implying that approximately 75% of market spreads can be explained by counterparty credit risk. In other words, counterparty risk alone can provide a good but not overwhelming prediction on spreads.


We then assess the joint effect. Because implied or model-generated spreads take into account both counterparty risk and collateralization, we assign the model-implied spreads as the explanatory variable and the market spreads as the response variable. The new adjusted is 0.9906, suggesting that counterparty risk and collateralization together have high explanatory power on premium spreads. The finding leads to practical implications, such as collateralization modeling allows forecasting credit spread.


Second, how does collateralization affect counterparty credit risk? Credit value adjustment (CVA) is the most prominent measurement in counterparty credit risk. We select all the CSA counterparty portfolios in the dataset and then compute their CVAs. We find that the CVA of a collateralized counterparty portfolio is always smaller than the one of the same portfolio without collateralization. We also find that credit risk is negatively correlated with collateralization as an increase in collateralization causes a decrease in credit risk. The empirical tests corroborate our theoretical conclusions that collateralization can reduce CVA charges and mitigate counterparty risk.



Pricing Collateralized OTC Derivatives