There are two primary types of models that attempt to describe default processes in the literature: structural models and reduced-form
(or intensity) models. Many practitioners in the credit trading arena have tended to gravitate toward the reduced-from models given their
mathematical tractability.
Central to the reduced-form models is the assumption that multiple defaults are independent conditional on the state of the economy.
In reality, however, the default of one party might affect the default probabilities of other parties. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2003) and
Zhang and Jorion (2007) find that a major credit event at one firm is associated with significant increases in the credit spreads of other
firms. Giesecke (2004), Das et al. (2006), and Lando and Nielsen (2010) find that a defaulting firm can weaken the firms in its network of
business links. These findings have important implications for the management of credit risk portfolios, where default relationships need
to be explicitly modeled.
The main drawback of the conditionally independent assumption or the reduced-form models is that the range of default correlations that
can be achieved is typically too low when compared with empirical default correlations (see Das et al. (2007)). The responses to correct
this weakness can be generally classified into two categories: endogenous default relationship approaches and exogenous default relationship
approaches.
The endogenous approaches include the contagion (or infectious) models and frailty models. The frailty models (see Duffie et al. (2009),
Koopman et al. (2011), etc) describe default clustering based on some unobservable explanatory variables. In variations of contagion or
infectious type models (see Davis and Lo (2001), Jarrow and Yu (2001), etc.), the assumption of conditional independence is relaxed and
default intensities are made to depend on default events of other entities. Contagion and frailty models fill an important gap but at
the cost of analytic tractability. They can be especially difficult to implement for large portfolios.
The exogenous approaches (see Li (2000), Laurent and Gregory (2005), Hull and White (2004), Brigo et al. (2011), etc) attempt to link
marginal default probability distributions to the joint default probability distribution through some external functions. Due to their
simplicity in use, practitioners lean toward the exogenous ones.
Given a default model, one can value a risky derivative contract and compute credit value adjustment (CVA) that is a relatively new area
of financial derivative modeling and trading. CVA is the expected loss arising from the default of a counterparty (see Brigo and Capponi
(2008), Lipton and Sepp (2009), Pykhtin and Zhu (2006), Gregory (2009), Bielecki et al (2013) and Crepey (2015), Xiao (2015), Xiao (2017),
etc.)
Collateralization as one of the primary credit risk mitigation techniques becomes increasingly important and widespread in derivatives
transactions. According the ISDA (2013), 73.7% of all OTC derivatives trades (cleared ad non-cleared) are subject to collateral agreements.
For large firms, the figure is 80.7%. On an asset class basis, 83.0% of all CDS transactions and 79.2% of all fixed income transactions are
collateralized. For large firms, the figures are 96.3% and 89.4%, respectively. Previous studies on collateralization include Johannes and
Sundaresan (2007), Fuijii and Takahahsi (2012), Piterbarg (2010), Bielecki, et al (2013) and Hull and White (2014), etc.
In general, a CDS contract is used to transfer the credit risk of a reference entity from one party to another. The risk circularity that
transfers one type of risk (reference credit risk) into another (counterparty credit risk) within the CDS market is a concern for financial
stability. Some people claim that the CDS market has increased financial contagion or even propose an outright ban on these instruments.
The standard CDS pricing model in the market assumes that there is no counterparty risk. Although this oversimplified model may be accepted
in normal market conditions, its reliability in times of distress has recently been questioned. In fact, counterparty risk has become one of
the most dangerous threats to the CDS market. For some time now it has been realized that, in order to value a CDS properly, counterparty
effects have to be taken into account (see ECB (2009)).
There is a significant increase in the use of collateral for CDS after the recent financial crises. Many people believe that, if a CDS is
fully collateralized, there is no risk of failure to pay. Collateral posting regimes are originally designed and utilized for bilateral risk
products, e.g., interest rate swap (IRS), but there are many reasons to be concerned about the success of collateral posting in offsetting
the risk of CDS contracts. First, the value of CDS contracts tends to move very suddenly with big jumps, whereas the price movements of IRS
contracts are far smoother and less volatile than CDS prices. Second, CDS spreads can widen very rapidly. Third, CDS contracts have many
more risk factors than IRS contracts. In fact, our model shows that full collateralization cannot eliminate counterparty risk completely
for a CDS contract.